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The Case of Mrs. Jones Revisited: Paternalism 
and Autonomy in Lawyer-Client Counseling 
Mark Spieget 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In 1991, William Simon wrote a short essay on lawyer-client 
counseling.1 He based his essay on his experience with a client 
he called Mrs. Jones. Simon's essay contrasts what he calls the 
autonomy or "informed consent" view with a paternalist or "best 
interest" view of counseling.2 He concludes that what he calls 
the refined versions of both views are more alike than previous 
commentators have acknowledged. This article argues that 
there are important differences between the paternalist and 
autonomy views of counseling that Simon's perspective fails to 
capture, in particular, the psychological and moral significance 
of the lawyer's intentions. 
Simon's essay is part of what might be called a 
postrevisionist view of lawyer-client relations. Until sometime 
in the mid-1970s, the subject of lawyer-client relations was 
seldom explored. As with most professional-client relations, it 
was simply assumed that the power to make significant deci-
sions was delegated to the professional. A challenge to that 
perspective arose when a number of authors, myself included, 
advocated a revisionist model in which the client had the power 
to make significant decisions within the relationship.3 Any reac-
* Associate Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. I thank Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, Robert Smith, Avi Soifer, and Paul Tremblay for their helpful 
comments on an earlier draft of this Article. I would also like to thank Laurie Hurtt 
for her excellent research assistance. An earlier version of this Article was presented 
to the Clinical Legal Theory Workshop at New York Law School. 
1. William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 
50 MD. L. REV. 213 (1991). 
2. See id. at 213. 
3. See, e.g., Susan R. Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice of Law, 48 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 307 (1980); Judith L. Maute, Allocation of Decisionmaking 
Authority Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1049 
(1984); Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and 
the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 41 (1979) [hereinafter Spiegel, Lawyering and 
Client DecisionmakingJ; Mark Spiegel, The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct: 
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tion begets an opposite reaction, of course, and in academia a 
revisionist account begets a postrevisionist account. The chal-
lenges to the revised model of lawyer-client relations, in which 
clients ought to have the power to make significant decisions, 
came from two directions. 
One challenge argued that a model giving clients control 
reinforces the ideology that lawyers have no moral responsibil-
ity to attempt to influence their clients' decisions. Drawing on 
the work of Heinz and Laumann,4 this postrevisionist account 
argued that in the corporate sector the advocates of client con-
trol had it backwards.5 The problem was not that lawyers con-
trolled their clients, but that corporate clients dictated to their 
lawyers. Under this view, what was (and still is) needed were 
ways to reinforce the lawyer's obligation to tell the corporate 
client that it was doing something wrong. 
The other challenge looked to the individual client. Some of 
these critics questioned whether those who espoused the auton-
omy view overvalued autonomy and failed to recognize other 
competing considerations.6 In addition, some argued that advo-
cates of client decision making ignored the reality that individ-
ual clients frequently have difficulty making decisions and that 
lawyers inevitably influence their clients' decisions by the way 
they order the material and how they present options to their 
clients.7 Simon's account of Mrs. Jones's case corresponds with 
these latter views. 
Lawyer-Client Decision Making and the Role of Rules in Structuring the Lawyer-Client 
Dialogue, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1003; Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model 
of Attorney-Client Relationship: The Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 315 
(1987). 
4. See JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL 
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 378-79 (1982). 
5. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 
1, 56-58 (1988); see also Robert W. Gordon & William H. Simon, The Redemption of 
Professionalism?, in LAWYERS' IDEALSILAWYERS' PRACTICES 230, 256-57 (Robert L. 
Nelson et al. eds., 1992); John K Morris, Power and Responsibility Among Lawyers 
and Clients: Comment on Ellmann's Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REv. 781, 783-
84 (1987). 
6. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988); David 
Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 AM. B. 
FOUND. REs. J. 637; David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the 
Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 
1035-37 (1990); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REv. 
1083 (1988). 
7. See Gordon, supra note 5, at 26-29. 
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What makes Simon's version worthy of a reply, even belat-
edly, is his argument that if we get beyond the crude formula-
tions "it is hard to distinguish the autonomy and paternalist 
views."s Simon presents a sophisticated version of both models 
that enhances our understanding of each,9 and thus makes an 
important contribution. mtimately, however, he overstates his 
case. There remain important differences between lawyers who 
act according to the dictates of the autonomy model and law-
yers who are "refined paternalists." Part II of this Article de-
scribes Simon's essay and his claims. In Part III, I argue that 
Simon is able to claim there are no significant differences in 
theory only by adopting particular definitions of the paternalist 
and autonomy views. I also contend that even accepting his 
definitions there still may be differences in theory between the 
refined paternalist and the refined autonomy view. In Part IV, I 
argue that despite the similarities between the two views there 
are still significant differences in practice. Mrs. Jones's case 
illustrates that one's starting point as a refined paternalist or 
as a refined autonomy practitioner affects the way one counsels 
a client. In addition, I believe that the intentions of the lawyer 
matter. The lawyer's intentions affect both the moral quality of 
the interaction between the lawyer and her client and the law-
yer herself. In Part V, I argue that Simon, therefore, has not 
proven that the refined paternalist and the refined autonomy 
view are the same, regardless of whether he is correct that 
there are no significant differences between the results 
achieved by the practitioner of the refined paternalist or the 
refined autonomy view. 
In claiming that Simon has not proven his case, I have not 
addressed the difficult questions of whether autonomy is over-
valued or defined improperly,1O or whether there are good rea-
sons because of the interests of others or society in general to 
8. Simon, supra note 1, at 224. 
9. Indeed, it is because Simon presents a sophisticated version of both models 
that we have used his essay in our teaching at Boston College Law School. 
10. See, for example, the writings of feminist authors such as Jennifer NedeIsky 
and Robin West, questioning whether autonomy is equivalent to individual, isolated 
decision making. Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and 
Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7 (1989); Robin West, Jurisprudence and 
Gender, 55 U. Cm. L. REV. 1 (1988). 
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override client preferences.ll I have also not addressed the 
question of whether in particular lawyering spheres, such as 
corporate practice, the most significant problem is client domi-
nation over lawyers. Different rules may be needed for that 
sphere of practice.12 I believe, however, that to the extent one 
thinks that autonomy is overvalued, should be overridden in 
particular situations, or is irrelevant when one is representing 
particular types of clients, it is important to face those issues 
directly and not by claiming that there is no meaningful differ-
ence between refined autonomy and refined paternalism. 
II. MRs. JONES'S STORY AND ITS LESSONS 
Simon's essay proceeds in five parts. In the first part he 
presents the story of Mrs. Jones, and in subsequent parts, he 
offers his analysis. Mrs. Jones, whom Simon represented, faced 
criminal charges for leaving the scene of an accident without 
identifying herself. She stated that she had identified herself, 
but the other driver, who was white, reported to the police that 
Mrs. Jones, who is black, had not. In charging her, the police 
accepted the other driver's version without an investigation. 
The police also treated her harshly when she came to the police 
station. 
Simon reports that he felt he had a fairly strong case. Given 
his inexperience (this. was Simon's first and last criminal case), 
he had a friend, who was experienced in traffic cases, act as co-
counsel. The friend dismissed Simon's strategy of exposing the 
police's racism as unrealistic and began negotiations \vith the 
prosecutor. After some discussion, the prosecutor offered to 
accept a plea of nolo contendere, which would result in six 
months probation and a criminal record that could be sealed 
after one year. 
The rest of the story is the critical part. Simon describes the 
counseling meeting he had with Mrs. Jones and her minister to 
discuss the plea bargain. Both the minister and Mrs. Jones 
wanted Simon to tell her what he thought she should do, but 
Simon resisted and instead spelled out what he saw as the ad-
11. See sources cited supra note 6. 
12. See Mark Spiegel, Lawyers and Professional Autonomy; Reflections on 
Corporate Lawyering and the Doctrine of Informed Consent, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 
139 (1987). 
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vantages and disadvantages of accepting the plea bargain. The 
advantages of accepting it were that it would spare her the 
anxiety of a trial and of having to testify. In the unlikely event 
that she lost at trial, it spared her six further months of anx-
ious waiting and the anxiety of a second trial.13 Finally, if Mrs. 
Jones somehow lost both trials, accepting the plea bargain 
spared her the loss of her driver's license, a modest fine, and a 
highly unlikely, but theoretically possible, jail term of up to six 
months. Simon also considered the disadvantages of accepting 
the prosecutor's offer: 
I couldn't say for sure that the criminal record Mrs. Jones 
would have for at least a year wouldn't adversely affect her in 
some concrete way, but I doubted it. (She was living primarily 
on Social Security and worked only part-time as a house-
keeper.) What bothered me was that the plea bargain would 
deprive her of any sense of vindication. Mrs. Jones struck me 
as a person who prized her dignity, deeply resented her recent 
abuse, and would attach importance to vindication.14 
In conveying this information, Simon mentioned the disadvan-
tages last. The final thing he said to Mrs. Jones was, "If you 
took their offer, there probably wouldn't be any bad practical 
consequences, but it wouldn't be total justice.,,15 In Simon's 
version of these events, it was this last statement that made 
the difference. Mrs. Jones and her minister rejected the plea 
bargain, stating: "We wantjustice.,,16 
Simon went back to his friend and said, "No deal. She wants 
justice.,,17 The friend replied, "Let me talk to her."IB He then 
proceeded to give her his advice. He did not tell Mrs. Jones 
what he thought she should do, and he went over the same 
considerations Simon did. The main differences were that the 
friend discussed the disadvantages of accepting the prosecutor's 
offer first, while Simon had gone over them last. The friend also 
described the remote possibility of jail in slightly more detail 
13. At the time of the Mrs. Jones case, the Massachusetts criminal trial system 
allowed an appeal from a bench trial decision to be tried de novo before a jury. See 
MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 278, § 18 (1981) (amended 1993). 
14. Simon, supra note 1, at 215. 
15. [d. 
16. [d. at 216. 
17. [d. 
18. [d. 
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than had Simon. Finally, he did not conclude by saying, "It 
wouldn't be total justice. II At the end of his presentation, Mrs. 
Jones and her minister decided to accept the plea bargain. 
Based upon this story, Simon draws a number of lessons. 
First, he notes that Mrs. Jones initially wanted to delegate the 
decision to him. He correctly concludes that this attitude poses 
a dilemma for the autonomy view because "the lawyer must 
either acquiesce in the client's choice to put her fate in the law-
yer's hands or 'force her to be free' by denying her the advice 
that she considers most valuable."l9 Second, Simon concludes 
that his story illustrates the ways lawyers influence their cli-
ents' decisions even when they think they are merely providing 
information. 
After developing these points, Simon, in the last part of his 
essay, describes what he means by the refined autonomy view 
of counseling and the refined paternalist view. For Simon, the 
refined autonomy view acknowledges that just presenting infor-
mation is not sufficient. The lawyer inevitably has to make 
decisions of relevance. Simply presenting information ignores 
the need to help the client make effective use of the informa-
tion.20 Hence, according to Simon, a lawyer adopting the refined 
autonomy view has "to present the information a typical person 
in the client's situation would consider relevant except to the 
extent the lawyer has reason to believe that the particular cli-
ent would consider different information relevant, in which case 
she is to present that information.'J21 Finally, thoughtful auton-
omy proponents realize that the client's autonomy is as much a 
goal of the counseling relationship as a premise.22 
Simon then presents his view of refined paternalism. The 
crude paternalist, according to Simon, "simply consults her own 
values; she asks what she would do in the client's circum-
stances or what she thinks a person with some general charac-
19. Id. at 217. Simon makes a subtle switch in the way he phrases the problem. 
First, he suggests she wanted. him to make the decision. He concludes, however, that 
he was denying her information she deemed valuable. These two ideas are closely 
related, but it is also possible that a lawyer will tell a client what she thinks her 
client should do and the client may still make a different decision. See Spiegel, 
Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking, supra note 3, at 49 n.30 (discussing the 
difference between providing information and wielding decision-making power). 
20. See Simon, supra note 1, at 222-23. 
21. Id. at 223. 
22. See id. 
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teristic of the client should do and tries to influence the client to 
adopt that course.,,23 The refined paternalist, however, attempts 
to ascertain what the client truly wants to do and influence her 
decision making to reach that decision. Hence for Simon, "once 
we get beyond the crude versions, it is hard to distinguish the 
autonomy and paternalist views,,24 because each starts from a 
construct of a reasonable client and then attempts to under-
stand the client as a concrete subject. Each contemplates a 
dialogue with the client that is essential for understanding the 
client and each has the danger of oppressing or misunderstand-
ing the client.25 
Part of Simon's reason for making his claim of similarity is 
based upon the conclusions about practice that he derived from 
Mrs. Jones's story. In this sense he argues that regardless of 
whether the refined autonomy view and the refined paternalist 
view are different in theory, they are similar in practice. But he 
also seems to make a larger claim-that they are not different 
in theory.26 In the next two parts, I discuss each of these claims. 
III. THEORY 
Simon is able to make his claim that the refined paternalist 
view and the refined autonomy view are similar in theory be-
cause he adopts a particular narrow version of each viewpoint. 
He first discounts the plausibility of the autonomy view by rely-
ing upon an idealized vision of autonomy. Then he adopts a 
weak view of paternalism and is able to argue that this weak 
view is similar to what he sees as a more realistic implementa-
tion of the autonomy view. 
In arguing against what he calls the crude autonomy view, 
Simon states that "any plausible conception of good practice 
will often require lawyers to make judgments about clients' best 
interests and to influence clients to adopt those judgments.'127 
This statement embraces several different claims. First, it in-
volves a conception of good practice. In his essay, Simon never 
spells out what his conception of good practice is; based upon 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 224. 
25. See id. 
26. See id. at 225. 
27. Id. at 213. 
314 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1997 
his other writings, however, it presumably involves tolerance of 
a significant amount oflawyer influence over clients in order to 
achieve what Simon would consider desirable ends.28 In discuss-
ing Mrs. Jones's case, bowever, Simon does not seem to rely on 
these contested views of good practice because he states that 
any plausible conception of good practice will involve judgments 
and influence of the type he believes undermines the autonomy 
view. Because he cites no empirical data, this claim relies upon 
the evocative power of Mrs. Jones's story. The central problem 
with this approach, as I discuss below, is that one can agree 
that Mrs. Jones's story illustrates his claim that good lawyering 
involves judgments about a client's best interests, but not nec-
essarily agree with the degree of influence Simon seems to be-
lieve it must entail. Second, Simon claims that lawyers exercise 
influence over their clients often. Again, we have a problem in 
knowing how to evaluate that part of the Claim. How frequent 
is often? How do we know that it occurs often? One story does 
not show that it occurs often. 
The more basic problem with Simon's argument is the par-
ticular vision of the autonomy view he adopts in order to rebut 
it. Simon states that he has shown the implausibility of the 
autonomy ideal.29 Implicit in this argument is 'that the auton-
omy ideal means that no interference with client autonomy is 
ever justified. But what Simon has done is describe an idealized 
version of autonomy, not the autonomy ideal. The autonomy 
ideal can be adapted to the real world.30 
For example, Beauchamp and Childress see autonomous 
action existing on a continuum ranging from fully present to 
wholly absent.31 Under such a view of autonomous action, one 
28. See, e.g., William H, Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A 
Comment on Poverty Law Scholarship in the PO.3t Modern, Post Reagan Era, 48 U. 
MIAMI L. REv. 1099 (1994) [hereinafter Simon, Dark Secret]; Simon, supra note 6, at 
1083; William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469 
(1984) [hereinafter Simon, Visions]. 
29. See Simon, supra note 1, at 218. 
30. See GERALD DWORKlN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 7 (1988) 
(arguing that we should not develop a theory of autonomy that makes it impossible 
or extremely unlikely that anybody ever has been or could be autonomous). 
31. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 123 (4th 
ed. 1994) (stating that autonomous action involves choosers who act (1) intentionally, 
(2) with understanding, and (3) without controlling influences that determine their 
action. Although arguably the first of these conditions is all or nothing, the next 
two-understanding and absence of controlling influence-are a matter of degree. Even 
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can debate about where on this continuum an action falls and 
whether a particular action meets one's conception of auton-
omy. Demonstrating that autonomy has been interfered with, 
however, is insufficient to prove that it is absent.32 Ultimately 
Simon adopts this weaker view of autonomy when he describes 
the refined autonomy view. My quarrel is not with this "modifi-
cation," but rather with his claim that because the autonomy 
view is not pure, it is implausible. Because he similarly adopts 
a weak view of paternalism, he could just as easily say that the 
paternalism view is implausible.33 
Paternalism can be defined in a number of ways, but com-
mon elements include the substitution of one person's judgment 
for another's for the benefit of the latter person.34 In the refined 
version, as stated above, the goal is to ascertain what the client 
truly wants to do and influence her decision making to reach 
that decision. I call this a weak version of paternalism because, 
in theory, it does not attempt to impose the paternalist's values 
upon the client, but to implement the client's own values.35 
Simon states that this vision of paternalism is the only one 
possible because we lack what he calls a "thick theory of the 
intention can be viewed as a matter of degree given the presence of mixed motives 
or the influence of the subconscious). 
32. For Beauchamp and Childress, an action can be autonomous as long as 
there is a substantial degree of understanding and freedom from constraint. See id.; 
see also DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 9 ("[O]ne may believe that autonomy is not an 
all-or-nothing concept but a matter of more or less."). 
33. Simon, at one point, says that his argument "does not amount to an 
embrace of paternalism [because] [t]he issue of paternalism remains moot until we 
can clearly distinguish a judgment that a client choice is autonomous from a 
judgment that a choice is in the client's best interests." Simon, supra note 1, at 213. 
34. See DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 123. Thompson defines paternalism slightly 
differently. He states it is the "imposing of constraints on an individual's liberty for 
the purpose of promoting his or her own good," Dennis F. Thompson, Paternalism in 
Medicine, Law and Public Policy, in ETIDCS TEACHING IN HIGHER EDUCATION 245-46 
(Callahan & Bok eds., 1980). 
35. Compare the definitions of strong and weak paternalism in Edmund D. 
Pellegrino, Autonomy, Beneficence, and the Experimental Subject's Consent: A Response 
to Jay Katz, 38 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 55 (1993). Strong paternalism occurs when the 
physician alone can know what is best for the patient because the patient cannot 
possibly grasp the subtleties of clinical decisions. Therefore, the physician has a duty 
to make decisions for the good of the patient. Weak paternalism implies that the 
physician ordinarily should respect the patient's autonomy, but is obliged to make the 
decision for the patient under certain circumstances, such as emergencies, when the 
patient is incompetent, or when a patient's decision-making capacity is impaired. See 
id. 
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good.,,3S Given that, it appears that the criterion for knowing 
what is best for somebody is determining what that person 
values. Indeed, Simon states that "the most notable theory of 
'the good' to come out of the law schools in recent years defines 
the good in terms of the 'choices' people make when not under 
'domination.',,37 According to Simon, this makes the refined 
paternalist view sound "very much like a theory of autonomous 
choice.,,3s 
But there may be differences, even in theory, in the latitude 
the refined paternalist allows herself to determine what the 
client's desired ends actually are. The refined version Simon 
describes is based upon the work of David Luban and Duncan 
Kennedy.39 Luban, according to Simon, allows paternalistic 
coercion when "the client's articulated goal fails to meet a mini-
mal test of objective reasonableness.,,4o Simon further asserts 
that this stance "is not denying the value of autonomy, just that 
the particular client has the capacity for autonomous choice.,,41 
The first difficulty in assessing this position is knowing what 
Simon means when he says he is adopting Luban's position. If 
he is following Luban strictly, the key word is "minimal." Luban 
makes it clear that he is not relying upon a reasonable-person 
standard to judge the validity of paternalistic interventions. 
Instead, Luban suggests that paternalism might be justified 
if we had some causal account of how an individual came to be 
incompetent independent of the reasonableness of his or her 
decision.42 Luban acknowledges this requirement of a causal 
account may be too strict. There are times when the "irrational-
ity of a person's wants [are] so manifest,,43 that the choice itself 
constitutes evidence of impairment. Luban does not conclude, 
36. Simon, supra note 1, at 225. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. See id. at 223; Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in 
Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal 
Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982); David Luban, Paternalism and the 
Legal Profession, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 454. 
40. Simon, supra note 1, at 223. 
41. Id. at 224-25. Simon's views as to why the client lacks the capacity for 
autonomous choice are ambiguous: Is it that the client is incompetent? Is it because 
of psychological incapacity based upon the particular transaction? Or is it because of 
false consciousness? 
42. See Luban, supra note 39, at 482. 
43. Id. at 477. 
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however, that irrational choices alone justify paternalism. We 
have an obligation, he argues, to discover whether the person is 
"genuinely addled."44 This is done by asking the person why he 
wants to pursue this "obviously disadvantageous path. If [the 
individual] can give us an account of his reasons, we should 
dismiss the hypothesis of incompetence and abandon our pater-
nalistic designs.,,45 This requirement of accounting for one's 
choice is for Luban, also, a minimal standard. Drawing upon an 
1890 New York testament case, he defines the standard as 
whether "any process is going on in the person's head that can 
be called 'inference from real facts.",46 If this is Simon's posi-
tion, he is correct that the refined paternalist position is very 
similar to the refined autonomy position, but that is because 
the refined paternalist has become a practitioner of the refined 
autonomy viewpoint.47 
On the other hand, if Simon means to emphasize the word 
"reasonable" rather than the word "minimal" when he says, 
U[P]aternalist coercion is justified when ... the client's articu-
lated goal fails to meet a minimal test of objective reasonable-
ness,,,48 then Simon is advocating something very different from 
the refined autonomy view.49 Most paternalists, refined or oth-
erwise, would assert that it is the unreasonableness of the cli-
ent's decision that shows lack of capacity.50 They would then go 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 479 (emphasis added) (citing In re Will of White, 24 N.E. 935 (N.Y. 
1890». 
47. Simon may disagree with the conclusion that the refined autonomy view 
adopts a minimal reasonableness test. He states that "to the extent [the refined 
autonomy view] differs from the paternalist view in failing to apply a minimum 
reasonableness test, [that choice] is not plausibly grounded in the value of autonomy, 
since that value presupposes a capacity for rational choice." Simon, supra note 1, at 
225. 
48. [d. at 223. 
49. Simon's conclusion to his essay essentially hedges on this point. He states: 
"Many of the best reasons we have for thinking that Mrs. Jones's choice was not 
autonomous are the reasons we have for thinking that it was not in her best 
interests." [d. at 226. At other places, Simon is also not clear on this point. At times 
he refers to the reasonableness of the client's actions: "It wasn't reasonable for her 
to want to put her fate in the hands of someone as inexperienced and ignorant as 
me." Id. at 224 (emphasis added). But sometimes he uses the phrase minimum 
reasonableness: "Even where it [the paternalist view] disregards client choices because 
they fail the minimum reasonableness test . . . ." Id. (emphasis added). 
50. See id. at 225. 
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on to say that they are justified in intervening because the cli-
ent's decision-making ,::apacity obviously is impaired. Such rea-
soning introduces severe problems of overinclusiveness. First, if 
we lack a "thick theory of the good," how do we know the cli-
ent's decision flunks some test of minimal reasonableness? If it 
is by reference to our own values, then the refined paternalist 
seems very much like an ordinary or crude paternalist. Second, 
using a reasonable-person standard to assess competency or, to 
use Simon's phrase, capacity for autonomous choice, is circular. 
We need some way to judge competency independent of the 
choices a person makes. Finally, assuming we can overcome 
these problems, why is it impossible to "distinguish a judgment 
that a client choice is autonomous from a judgment that a 
choice is in the client's best interests?,,51 It is one thing to claim 
that the decision is part of the data we use to evaluate a client's 
decision-making competence. It is another to claim that the 
unreasonableness of the decision proves the client's impaired 
capacity. 52 If this is what Simon means by a refined paternalist, 
it would license significantly more intervention than the refined 
autonomy view. 
As stated above, in addition to relying upon the work of 
Luban, Simon also relies upon an article by Duncan Kennedy. 
Kennedy's article is wide-ranging and attempts to show that 
paternalism, particularly legislative paternalism, is more per-
vasive than we acknowledge. 53 In his final section, Kennedy 
discusses the problem of justifying paternalism. According to 
Simon, Kennedy adopts a somewhat different position from 
Luban. Kennedy "does not hold the subject to an external stan-
dard such as reasonableness, but holds him to an interpretation 
of the subject's own projects and commitments.,,54 The goal is to 
51. [d. at 213. 
52. Simon does modify this position somewhat in his conclusion. There he 
states: 
I don't claim that we can never plausibly conceive of a meaningfully 
autonomous choice that is not in the chooser's best interests. But I would 
argue, at least, that there is a large category of cases involving legal 
decisions, where, given the circumstances in which the decisions must be 
made, we have no criteria of autonomy entirely independent of our criteria 
of best interests. 
Id. at 226. 
53. See Kennedy, supra note 39. 
54. Simon, supra note 1, at 224. 
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"work for the choice that seems most consistent with [the 
paternalist's] understanding of who the client is.,,55 Thus, ac-
cording to Simon, when the refined paternalist "disregards the 
client's articulated choice, she has concluded that the client has 
misunderstood either himself or how the options relate to his 
deeper goals.,,5G The difficulty again is overinclusion. It is true 
that the practitioner of the refined autonomy view has to make 
assessments of the client's motives and values in order to assist 
the client to make a decision. The question is whether Ken-
nedy's view gives significantly more license to the refined 
paternalist to use her own intuitions to second guess the cli-
ent's choices than the practitioner of the refined autonomy view 
would find appropriate. 
Kennedy, in addition to relying upon intuition to justify the 
"ad hoc paternalism" he endorses, relies upon the concept of 
false consciousness.57 Rather than arguing that the object of the 
paternalistic intervention is psychologically incapacitated, Ken-
nedy argues that certain mistakes that individuals make about 
their real interests result from false consciousness. 58 Although 
he is not absolutely clear about this, the unifying concept seems 
to be that there is something inherent in the social structure 
which leads to this false consciousness. 59 The difficulty is not 
that there is no false consciousness, but that it has an "I know 
it when I see it" quality. To the extent we say somebody has 
false consciousness because he or she is about to make a deci-
sion we believe to be a mistake, the concept has no measure of 
validation other than the wrong decision. Using the concept of 
false consciousness this way makes it both broadly 
overinclusive and circular, just as the justification of paternal-
ism based upon a showing that somebody is incompetent solely 
because of the unreasonableness of his or her decisions is 
overinclusive and circular. Again, if this is what Simon means 
by a refined paternalist, I believe that he would license signifi-
cantly more intervention than the refined autonomy view.GO 
55. [d. 
56. [d. 
57. See Kennedy, supra note 39, at 638. 
58. See id. 
59. See id. at 627. 
60. Compare Simon's discussion of the ·Critical view" of practice in which he 
states: 
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In conclusion, Simon is correct that the refined autonomy 
view and the paternalist view he describes are similar in theory 
because the refined autonomy view is a weak version of auton-
omy and the refined paternalist view is a weak view of pater-
nalism. This is not surprising. Weak views of any theory usu-
ally attempt to incorporate objections or opposing viewpoints. 
Simon may have shown that these refined or weak views are 
points on a spectrum or continuum rather than distinct catego-
ries, but does that mean they are the same? The differences in 
theory described above may still lead to differences in practice. 
Evaluating this claim :requires further exploration of how each 
of these two theories works in practice. For that exploration, I 
will look at Mrs. Jones's story in more detail. 
IV. PRACTICE 
Simon uses the Mrs. Jones story to support many of his 
conclusions about practice. He recognizes that his conclusions 
can be attacked on that basis.61 First is the problem of general-
izing from one story.62 Stories may enrich our understanding by 
providing qualitative information and perspectives on events 
other kinds of data lack. I accept that position-indeed as a 
clinical teacher, I embrace it. Our teaching is heavily based 
upon drawing lessons from particular experiences and general-
izing from those experiences. There remains a problem how-
ever. One cannot simply assume any particular story or even a 
[The Critical Vision of practice] is not reluctant for the lawyer to make 
controversial, intuitive judgments in interpreting and applying the ideal of 
nonhierarchical communilij'. Although it recognizes that such judgments are 
often unverifiable, it aspires to a distinctive kind of verification. The precept 
that the lawyer further the client's interests, as she understands them, is 
qualified by the precept that she also try to enhanC3 the client's capacity to 
express her own interests. The authoritative test of the lawyer's judgment 
is that the client come to share it under conditions in which the lawyer 
believes that the client's understanding is not affected by conditions of 
hierarchy. 
Simon, Visions, supra note 28, at 486. In this essay, however, Simon does not argue 
that the autonomy view, which he calls the "Professional view," is the same as the 
"Critical view." Instead, he contrasts the two views, particularly with regard to group 
representation. 
61. See Simon, supra note 1, at 218. 
62. By "story" I do not necessarily mean a work of fiction, but rather a 
narrative. 
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specific group of stories is typical.63 By itself, Simon's story can 
only be suggestive. 
Second, there are aspects of Mrs. Jones's story that present 
problems. Simon met with his client for only ten minutes.64 He 
acknowledges the rushed nature of the meeting, but states that 
"[t]ime is scarce in nearly all practice situations.,,65 Although 
accurate, this is not persuasive. One does not need unlimited 
time in order to recognize that having more time might make a 
difference. 
Simon uses a medical example from his own experience to 
illustrate some of his points. Let me do the same. My wife and I 
were members of a health maintenance.organization. When my 
wife developed a chronic illness, we found the HMO unsatisfac-
tory. One of the major reasons for our dissatisfaction was that 
some doctors only allotted short periods of time to see patients, 
usually approximately fifteen minutes. We switched to a health 
plan that allowed us to see physicians of our choice. Those phy-
sicians allot us at least twice as much time to discuss treatment 
options. Our experience is that there is a significant difference 
between fifteen and thirty minutes.66 
Simon is on stronger ground when he says there are intrac-
table problems that even more time cannot cure. I agree and 
will discuss this shortly. But there is one more issue that raises 
significant questions. Simon states that some people question 
whether he or his friend could understand his client because 
she was elderly, female, and black, and he and his friend were 
63. I believe we accept Simon's Mrs. Jones story if it resonates with our own 
experience. If we reject its typicality, it is because we feel it is discordant with our 
own stories. On the larger debate about the significance of stories, compare Daniel 
A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal 
Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993), and Daniel A Farber & Suzanna Sherry, 
The 200,000 Cards of Dimitri Yurasov: Further Reflections on Scholarship and Truth, 
46 STAN. L. REV. 647 (1994), and Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional 
Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. 251 (1992), with Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 
79 CAL. L. REV. 971 (1991), and Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 255 (1994), and Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School: A Reply to 
Farber and Sherry, 46 VAND. L. REV. 665 (1993). 
64. See Simon, supra note 1, at 215. 
65. Id. at 218. 
66. This is for a number of reasons. The more time a doctor has to learn about 
a patient, the better her ability to tailor her advice to the patient's needs and 
concerns. The additional time also gives the patient an opportunity to explain their 
situation to the doctor. One might argue, however, that this additional 15 minutes 
is significant in terms of cost and not just a small difference. 
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none of these.67 Though Simon acknowledges the force of these 
objections (and so do I), he ultimately concludes that such crit-
ics "underestimate the capacity of people to empathize across 
social distance.u68 Again, I agree. 
To bridge this gap, however, takes not only training and 
effort, as Simon acknowledges,69 but it also takes time to de-
velop a relationship. I do not mean to repeat the point that the 
ten minutes spent at the courthouse were too few, although I 
believe they were. Rather, I want to emphasize that too often 
we view counseling with clients as one-shot encounters. My 
experience is that the only way I can claim to have some clear 
sense of a client (or anybody else for that matter) is as a result 
of several meetings. Simon did have at least one other meeting 
with the client, but we do not know much about that encounter. 
Presumably it was the initial meeting. Perhaps there were 
other meetings, but he does not describe them. Moreover, given 
the structure of the criminal justice system, at some point prior 
to the day of trial there should have been discussion of accept-
ing a plea bargain. Simon and Mrs. Jones would have been 
better prepared to discuss it on the day of trial if there had 
been. Because some of the difficulties that Simon describes are 
a result of having only a one-shot relationship, Simon's story 
seems more typical of the types of relationships some public 
defender services have with their clients.7o This may make it 
important to explore these one-shot counseling sessions for that 
segment of practice, but it makes it difficult to accept Mrs. 
Jones's case as an exemplar from which to derive a theory of 
counseling. 
Although appropriate, these criticisms about the typicality 
of Simon's story and whether one can generalize from it, are too 
easy. They do not prove that Simon's analysis is wrong, but 
they do require us not to accept it uncritically. As Simon also 
67. See Simon, supra note 1, at 221. 
68. [d. at 222. 
69. See id. 
70. See, e.g., JONATHAN D. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE 
DEFENDANT'S PERSPECTIVE 105-15 (1972); Jonathan D. Casper, Did You Have a 
Lawyer When You Went to Court? No, [ Had a Public Defender, 1 YALE REV. L. & 
SOC. ACTION 4, 6 (1971); Rodney Thaxton & Lida Rodriguez-Taseff, Professionalism 
and Life in the Trenches: The Case of the Public Defender, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 185, 
187 (1995). 
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argues, there are certain "intractable problemsIJn that propo-
nents of the autonomy view have to take into account. More-
over, I believe he is correct when he argues that a refined view 
of the autonomy position involves risks of interfering with the 
client's autonomy and perhaps actual interference. 
The first intractable problem arose when Mrs. Jones asked 
for Simon's advice. As Simon argues, the lawyer can either 
acquiesce or force the client to be free by not supplying the re-
quested advice. Let us assume the lawyer does give the advice. 
That would seem consistent with a view that the client's ex-
press wishes should control, but it has a cost-the cost being 
that the client may defer to the lawyer's judgment without 
thinking through the decision herself. Short-term autonomy 
may triumph over a long-run interest in autonomy. 
On the other hand, although the decision not to answer the 
client can be justified by an analogy to situations where clients 
are asked to make decisions under conditions of coercion, this 
analogy does not work. The client is typically not in a position 
of coercion. She freely asks for the lawyer's opinion and in 
many situations it makes sense to comply. The client may not 
want to take the time to master what is necessary to make an 
informed decision or to pay the lawyer for the time to explain in 
enough detail so that the client can fully understand. The best 
decision rule for the client, therefore, may be to delegate the 
decision to an expert whom the client trustS.72 
The proponents of the autonomy view might argue that the 
client is temporarily incapacitated-the psychological pressure 
of having to decide has made the client retreat to authority. The 
problem for the autonomy practitioner, however, is how to dis-
tinguish the client who is incapacitated from the client who has 
good reasons for delegating. Moreover, the autonomy practitio-
ner has to determine what degree of psychological pressure 
justifies overriding the client's expressed preference. At this 
point, the analysis or justification for the decision not to answer 
the client's request begins to resemble the kind of analysis that 
might be used by advocates of paternalism. And if so, does that 
71. Simon, supra note 1, at 218. 
72. See generally Michael H. Shapiro, Is Autonomy Broke?, 12 LAw & HUM. 
BEHAV. 353 (1988) (discussing the view that some delegations of decision-making 
power are rational). 
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not prove Simon's poin.t that in the world of practice these posi-
tions merge? 
Yet is this conflict as stark or as intractable as Simon 
makes it? Why not give the client the information about what 
you think she should do based upon your understanding of her 
values and tell her just that.73 For example, in Mrs. Jones's 
case, Simon had at least two plausible and realistic approaches 
to take once asked for his opinion. The first was to say, "I will 
give you my opinion, but I wonder whether you should rely 
upon it, because I am not a regular practitioner in criminal 
law. ,,74 If I were standing there, I would add, "I don't know you 
very well so it is hard for me to judge what is best for you in 
this situation." Alternatively the lawyer might explain why, in 
her judgment, giving her opinion might skew the client's judg-
ment and then leave it to the client to decide what to do next.75 
Perhaps you are not persuaded that these suggestions solve 
the problem, so let us. assume there are situations in which a 
proponent of the autonomy view would refuse to give her opin-
ion out of fear that the client would simply defer to the lawyer's 
judgment.76 What is the significance of this point? Is it devas-
tating for the autonomy view? Does it mean the autonomy view 
lapses into hopeless contradiction and therefore is incoherent? 
This depends upon what we mean by autonomy. If we contend 
that autonomy is a pure concept that means all or nothing, then 
the answer might be yes.77 But one can have a weaker view of 
autonomy and even recognize that in the real world none of us 
is completely autonomous in any situation. If so, then Simon's 
objection has to be noted, but it is not devastating. It does not 
necessarily mean that because I override my client in one re-
73. Although at one time advocates of the autonomy view could be read to 
advocate never giving the client your opinion, most proponents now say that it 
depends. Compare DAVID A BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND 
COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 186-87 (1977), with DAVID A BINDER ET 
AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 279-80 (1991). 
74. Simon defends hiE. decision not to advise Mrs. Jones by citing his 
incompetence and claiming that it would not be in her long-term best interests to 
accept advice from a lawyer such as him. See Simon, supra note 1, at 217. 
75. Stephen EHmann is concerned that this type of dialogue is manipulative 
'because it does not let the client know she has the autonomy to delegate. See 
Stephen EHmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REv. 717, 745-46 (1987). 
76. See DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 118. 
77. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33. 
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spect, I override my client in all respects. It does mean that I 
cannot argue that I will never override my client's espoused 
preferences. It also raises the important issue of if I override 
my client's decision here, why not in other situations? 
In this respect, it can be claimed that the refined autonomy 
view resembles paternalism because both require the same 
judgment: in what situations am I justified in overriding my 
client's expressed preferences? The question remains, however, 
does this mean the autonomy view is the same as the refined 
paternalist view? I will discuss this problem below.7s Before 
that, however, I will review Simon's other intractable problem: 
the necessity for choice in presenting information and options. 
As the Mrs. Jones story illustrates, the lawyer's decision 
about what information to include and the ordering and phras-
ing of that information can significantly affect client decisions. 
Mrs. Jones refused the offer of a plea bargain when Simon men-
tioned last that "it wouldn't be total justice. ,,79 She agreed to 
accept the plea bargain when Simon's friend discussed the dis-
advantages of trial last, described the remote possibility of jail 
in slightly more detail than had Simon, and did not end by stat-
ing, "It wouldn't be total justice." 
I would add one more type of intervention to this list. An 
attorney who espouses the refined autonomy view should be 
willing to help reframe client choices and even limit options as 
the counseling dialogue develops. At the beginning of a discus-
sion there may be a number of options that seem possible. As 
the discussion proceeds, however, it may become apparent that 
some options are not realistic either because they cannot be 
implemented or because the client is not interested in them. In 
such a case, the attorney should be willing to discard some 
choices. In doing this, however, there is the danger that the 
attorney will limit the client's choices by discarding choices the 
client would eventually adopt. so Similarly, at some point the 
lawyer should be willing to express what she hears back to the 
client to narrow the considerations or trade-offs the client has 
78. See infra text accompanying note 85. 
79. Simon, supra note 1, at 216. 
80. Simon illustrates this point in his discussion of an option not presented to 
Mrs. Jones-the possibility of defending on the ground that the prosecution was 
racially discriminatory. Indeed, Simon's illustration is an even stronger example 
because he never presented the option in the first place. See id. at 218. 
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to make. For example, in Mrs. Jones's case, Simon or his friend 
might have said: 
We need to decide about whether to accept the plea bargain. 
From what you have told me this involves you deciding be-
tween the very small risk of jail and the pressure of wanting 
this to be over versus your feelings that accepting the plea 
bargain would not be right. It wouldn't be totaljustice.81 
It is possible, however, that in reframing the issue to express 
what the lawyer thinks the client values, the lawyer will have it 
wrong.82 Again, this intervention raises the risk of influencing 
the client's decision. 
This problem of having an inevitable influence on client 
choice cannot be avoided. That is why Simon is correct in de-
scribing the problem as intractable. There is no completely 
neutral point from which to decide what information to include, 
how to describe it, and what clarifying interventions are appro-
priate.83 Moreover, despite the wish of law students whom I 
supervise that it be otherwise, I believe there is no way to avoid 
engaging in this behavior if one wants to help a client reach a 
decision. Merely providing a list of information and factors is 
not helpful for most clients. Doing only this merely satisfies the 
formal requirements of client autonomy.84 
81. See the similar example in RoGER S. HAYDOCK ET AL., LAWYERING PRACTICE 
AND PLANNING 89 (1996). 
82. See the discussion of the issue of information overload versus limiting 
options in BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 31, at 159-60. 
83. Simon expands upon this point in a later article in which he states: 
[T]he advice lawyers give clients and the representational tactics they 
choose on behalf of clients are inevitably influenced by the lawyers' own 
values. This advice and these tactics in turn influence clients' perceptions 
of their interests. There is no value-free mode of communication in which 
clients could be presented with unfiltered information needed for decision. 
Advice has to be limited and structured in ways that will reflect the 
advisor's values. Similarly, tactical choices that the lawyer makes may affect 
not only opposing parties but also the client's sense of his own interests. 
Simon, Dark Secret, supra note 28, at 1102. As stated in the text, I agree with this 
position. Where Simon and I disagree is on the implications of this inevitability. For 
him, it means that since influence is inevitable, it can be more easily justified. For 
me, since influence is inevitable, it is important to have structures that recognize that 
fact and attempt to lessen its effect. 
84. Compare the similar problem in implementing informed consent in medical 
decisions. Signing a piece of paper that lists various risks may satisfy the legal 
requirements for informed ce·nsent, but it does not mean that the client has been 
involved in decision making. See, e.g., Cathy J. Jones, Autonomy and Informed 
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Given this reality of practice, Simon argues the refined 
paternalist and the practitioner of the refined autonomy view 
are doing the same thing: they are both presenting options that 
the reasonable client would want to hear and adjusting those 
options as they learn more about the client. Furthermore, a law-
yer committed to implementing client autonomy would struggle 
with the same issues Simon and his friend did: how do we dis-
cuss the possibility of jail and how do we deal with the client's 
concern for justice or vindication? In that sense, Simon is correct 
that the refined autonomy view and the refined paternalistic 
view are similar in practice. Reality presents a context which 
neither model can escape. 
At this point, we have to consider what it means to claim 
that it is hard to distinguish one from the other. Is it that they 
struggle with the same issues or is it something more than that? 
A claim for similarity would at least have to involve the asser-
tion that they would resolve these issues in a similar fashion. 
This does not mean that in every instance the person espousing 
the refined autonomy view and the refined paternalist would 
resolve these conflicts identically. These situations invariably 
involve judgment. Different individuals might come to different 
judgments in any particular situation. If, however, we found 
systemic differences between the two viewpoints that are not the 
result of individual judgmental difference,8s then the claim of 
similarity is substantially weaker. I believe that Simon's experi-
ence with Mrs. Jones is capable of being used to illustrate that 
Consent in Medical Decisionmaking: Toward a New Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 47 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 379, 397-406 (1990). The author describes her observations over six 
months in a 900-bed medical center. She concludes that "the informed consent 
procedures that most of [the doctors] used, while sometimes meeting the letter of the 
informed consent doctrine, rarely met what should be its spirit, i.e., providing adequate 
information and attempting to ensure that patients understand the information so they 
can make knowing and voluntary decisions about medical care." Id. at 398; see also 
Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 934 (1994) ("One 
revealing sign of the extent to which physicians orchestrate a more or less perfunctory 
process is a now-common locution among physicians. They do not say that they have 
obtained the patient's consent; rather, they say that they have 'consented the patient'J. 
85. Compare David Luban's discussion of paternalism in which he states he is 
only considering paternalistic actions, not paternalistic structures. See Luban, supra 
note 39, at 460. Luban defines a paternalistic structure as "a social arrangement that 
makes it especially likely that paternalistic actions will be performed whether or not 
they are justified." Id. 
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there are systemic differences between the refined paternalist 
view and the refined a.utonomy view. It illustrates why a com-
mitment to client autonomy might produce different conversa-
tions than those Simon describes. 
Simon's friend assumed that what the client wanted (or 
perhaps what he thought the typical client would want) was to 
avoid jail at any cost. He, therefore, framed his discussion of 
the pros and cons of accepting the plea bargain with this end in 
mind. When the client agreed, he saw no need to test the cli-
ent's decision. I believe a lawyer committed to client autonomy 
would have at least reminded the client that in her previous 
conversation with Simon she had expressed a desire for "jus-
tice." Therefore, even though Simon may be correct that both 
the refined autonomy view and the refined paternalistic view 
have to make assumptions about what a reasonable client 
might do, the question remains what one does when data comes 
to you indicating that. this client does not meet your expecta-
tions of what a typical client might want. Simon's friend either 
did not hear the inconsistent data or ignored it as being incon-
sistent with the client's long-term preferences.86 If this illus-
trates a systemic skewing, a characteristic difference between 
the paternalistic and autonomy views, then Simon's claim of 
similarity seems less plausible. 
Simon's friend, however, might be considered a crude 
paternalist implementing his views of what he thought a client 
would want. How would a refined paternalist handle the same 
problem? Simon gives us a description of that by telling us that, 
after :reflection upon this case, he came to believe Mrs. Jones 
really did want justice. He then states that if he were to redo 
the counseling session he would not mention the possibility of 
jail. 87 He justifies this decision because he believes that "she 
86. Compare a similar incident described by Professor Cathy Jones. Professor 
Jones observed a patient who was counseled by one doctor who disclosed to the 
patient the risks and benefits of the alternative treatments feasible for her type of 
cancer. After this meeting, the patient chose treatment by chemotherapy. However, 
a second doctor disagreed with this decision and met with the patient to discuss her 
options further. After these additional meetings, the patient changed her mind. At no 
point was there an exploration with the patient of the reasons for changing her mind. 
See Jones, supra note 84, at 403-04. 
87. See Simon, supra nl)te 1, at 219 •. As an alternative to not mentioning jail, 
Simon states that he might have said: "There is no chance you could go to jail." Id. 
This approach is similar in that it removes jail as something for the client to be 
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was bound to be disabled by any description of jail as a real, 
even if small, possibility."sS This position can be made consis-
tent with some versions of an autonomy perspective. For exam-
ple, one justification of a therapeutic privilege by a doctor to 
withhold information from a patient is that the disclosure of the 
information will prevent the patient from making an autono-
mous decision. S9 
But how did Simon know that Mrs. Jones was bound to be 
disabled by the description of jail? Simon cites to psychological 
literature that states that people overvalue unlikely, but disas-
trous, risks.90 In addition he relies upon two pieces of data. 
First, he mentions an experience he had with another client.91 
Second, he analogizes to a personal experience he had with a 
doctor.92 Even accepting the validity of the psychological studies 
and his examples, the question remains how Simon knew Mrs. 
Jones was going to be similarly affected. It appears that Simon 
is relying upon his assumptions about a typical client. The data 
he presents supports this conclusion.93 
Simon argues that we should adjust our assumptions about 
the typical client based upon the information we have about the 
particular client. But in this case, the information we have 
about Mrs. Jones does not support the conclusion that she was 
disabled by the mention of jail from considering other possibili-
ties. In the first counseling session Simon had with Mrs. Jones, 
he mentioned the possibility of jail, yet this did not prevent her 
from choosing to seek justice. Based upon this experience, one 
might conclude that Mrs. Jones was able to evaluate the possi-
bility of jail and still make other choices. Simon never explains 
why he ignores his own data. I have never met Mrs. Jones and 
only know her through Simon's description, so he may be right 
in his conclusion that she was going to be disabled by discus-
concerned about. It does, however, raise questions of justifying deceit rather than 
omission. 
88. [d. 
89. See DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 118-19. 
90. See Simon, supra note 1, at 218-19 n.3. 
91. See id. at 219. 
92. See id. 
93. Simon states that although Mrs. Jones's anxiety was no greater than he 
"guess[edl the median person's would be in her situation,' he still thought "she was 
bound to be disabled by the description of jail as a realistic, even if small, possibility." 
[d. 
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sion of jail. At no point, however, does Simon consider the possi-
bility of both discussing jail and achieving justice. 
It is possible that Simon is a bad refined paternalist and 
that therefore all I have shown is that his own implementation 
is flawed. If that is the case, it does not necessarily mean the 
model is flawed. As my colleague Paul Tremblay has pointed 
out in a related context, however, rules of thumb or orientations 
directed toward practice have to be judged not only by their 
theoretical soundness, but also by how they are likely to be 
implemented in practice.94 Therefore, although there may be 
explanations for the description Simon gives, Simon's example 
of the refined paternalist in action raises the question of 
whether Simon's initial orientation as a refined paternalist 
affects how willing he is to assume that certain information 
would disable Mrs. Jones.95 
Simon gives an example of how one's preconceptions can 
influence behavior when he discusses why the typical lawyer 
would mention the possibility of jail to Mrs. Jones, but would 
not mention the possibility of raising the defense of a racially 
discriminatory prosecution. As he explains it, most lawyers 
would think that a client would not want to hear about a de-
fense with little probability of success that would likely alienate 
the judge, particularly in a case with strong conventional de-
fenses.9,s On the other hand, these same lawyers mention the 
possibility of jail, even though the probability of going to jail is 
about the same as succeeding on the racial discrimination 
claim.97 They do so because they assume most clients would 
want to hear about jail. 98 Simon concludes that these practices 
are not based upon an understanding of clients (or the particu-
94. See Paul R. Tremblay, Practiced Moral Activism, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 9 
(1995). 
95. The therapeutic privilege in medicine is also justified by the fear that 
disclosure of information would lead a patient to pick the wrong treatment option. See 
DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 119. 
96. See Simon, supra note 1, at 218. 
97. See id. at 218-19. 
98. See id. at 218. Nancy Rhoden describes a similar example among obstetric 
doctors. What she calls the maximin strategy (choosing the alternative that makes 
the best of the worst possible outcome) of such doctors is so much part of their 
collective unconscious that these doctors do not see it as one strategy or possibility 
among many. See Nancy K Rhoden, Informed Consent in Obstetrics: Some Special 
Problems, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 67, 69-72 (1987). 
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lar client), but arise from two other influences. One is "the posi-
tivist strain of professional legal culture that tends to privilege 
specific statutory language over common-law or constitutional 
principle and material over nonmaterial consequences.1J99 The 
second influence is risk aversion. Lawyers may give priority to 
avoiding disappointing the client over achieving a benefit that 
the client does not anticipate. By not raising the possibility of 
making a discrimination claim, the lawyer eliminates the risk 
that the client will blame him if the claim is unsuccessfully 
asserted. 100 
The question here is whether a similar mindset101 influences 
the refined paternalist, leading to different judgments about 
client capacities from those made by a lawyer who perceives 
herself as committed to client autonomy. I have no proof that 
this is true, but Simon's story suggests that it might be the 
case.102 So does evidence from medicine. One study of doctors 
indicates, for example, that physician-hypothesized negative 
effects from disclosure rarely materialize.103 Another concludes 
that terminal patients are much more likely to want to be told 
of their illnesses than doctors are likely to tell them.104 A third 
states that doctors use the therapeutic privilege as a justifica-
tion for withholding information and thereby manipulate pa-
tients to consent to what the physician considers a medically 
desirable choice. 105 
99. Simon, supra note 1, at 220. 
100. See id. 
101. This might also be described as a preconception or a disposition. 
102. Cf. Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and 
Refinement, 32 ARIz. L. REv. 501, 553 n.243 (1990) ("[T]here may be nothing inherent 
in a client-centered approach that causes the lawyer to be more aware of his biases, 
but it seems plausible that a lawyer who focuses on the relationship factors and is 
self-conscious about his role will at least be more likely than the traditional lawyer 
to examine such factors."). 
103. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 31, at 151 (citing Kimberly Quaid 
et al., Informed Consent for a Prescription Drug: Impact of Disclosed Information on 
Patient Understanding and Medical Outcomes, 15 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 249-
59 (1990». 
104. See ROBERT M. VEATCH, DEATH, DYING, AND THE BIOLOGICAL REVOLUTION: 
OUR LAsT QUEST FOR RESPONSmILITY 229-41 (1976). 
105. See Charles W. Lidz & Alan Meisel, Informed Consent and the Structure of 
Medical Care, in 2 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATlONSHlP 317 
(President's Comm'n for the Study of Ethical Problems in Med. & Biomedical 
Behavioral Research ed., 1982) [hereinafter HEALTH CARE DECISIONS]. 
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I am not arguing that in every case these tendencies make a 
difference. There may be a great number of cases where the 
issue of paternalism does not arise or where if it does arise, the 
refined paternalist and refined practitioner of the autonomy 
view are doing much the same thing. In cases where the issue 
of paternalistic behavior is particularly acute, however, one's 
starting point or default position can matter significantly. It 
can matter not only because one's psychology or orientation 
influences behavior, but also because starting points or base-
lines influence behavior when we are not sure what to do. If one 
believes autonomy should be the general rule and paternalism a 
limited exception, there must be more evidence to overcome 
that presumption. Conversely, if one believes paternalism is 
prevalent and to some extent inevitable, then justifying any 
particular exercise of that behavior will be easier. Therefore, 
despite Simon's claim to the contrary, there are reasons to be-
lieve that there are differences in practice between the refined 
paternalist view and tne refined autonomy view. 
V. INTENTIONS MATTER 
Even if Simon is co:rrect that the refined autonomy view and 
the refined paternalist view are very similar in practice and 
that there are no differences in implementation between the 
two views, there still may be important differences if we focus 
on the intentions of the lawyers who implement these views in 
practice. Assume that we have transcripts of a skilled practitio-
ner of the refined autonomy view and a skilled practitioner of 
the refined paternalist view counseling the same client under 
the same circumstances, and that these transcripts look quite 
similar. Does that mean there are no significant differences 
between the two? In order to answer this question, we have to 
address the difficult question of whether intentions or motives 
matter. lOG 
Simon's explanation of why he was justified in refusing to 
give Mrs. Jones his opinion about what to do provides a good 
106. Even if the words c·n the transcript are the same, one could argue that 
inevitably there will be differe'nces in tone or emotion. If so, this is also relevant to 
evaluating the actions. See Nancy Sherman, The Place of Emotions in Kantian 
Morality, in IDENTITY, CHARACTER, AND MORALITY 149, 150-54 (Owen Flanagan & 
Amelie Oksenberg Rorty eds., 1990). 
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test. Simon feels he was correct in not providing Mrs. Jones 
with advice she wanted because he doubted his legal compe-
tence in criminal law and because he did not know Mrs. Jones 
very well. But he does not see this decision as distinctively sup-
ported by his respect for Mrs. Jones's autonomy. Rather it could 
as easily be supported because "it was not in Mrs. Jones's best 
interests for her to delegate the decision to someone as ignorant 
about both the law and her.u107 Arguably, an exponent of the 
autonomy view might also refrain from giving an opinion to 
Mrs. Jones,108 but the motive would be different. Presumably, 
the motive would be to allow the client the time to think about 
delegating the decision, or to override the client's short-run 
autonomy in the interests of the client's long-run autonomy. 109 
Are these differences in motive merely semantic? Even if they 
are not, do they matter? From the client's perspective it is the 
same information being denied-the lawyer's opinion. 
It is a familiar principle in law that intentions do matter. 
The criminal-law requirement of mens rea expresses that view-
point. In the law of torts, intentional actions justify higher dam-
ages through the availability of punitive damages than ordinary 
negligence.110 In both these cases, however, the act is wrongful, 
and one might argue that this distinguishes these situations 
from the discussion of the refined paternalist's intent. At least 
within Kantian ethics, however, the reasons for action are criti-
cal. l11 Doing the right thing for the wrong reasons is not of the 
same moral worth as doing the same act for the correct reasons. 
Moreover, one does not have to be a Kantian to argue that rea-
sons for actions matter. Ethical theories that have virtue or 
character as their basis also focus upon the motives of agents. 
107. Simon, supra note I, at 217. 
108. See discussion supra in text accompanying notes 73-76. 
109. These are the justifications that autonomy theorists have offered for refusing 
to accept delegation of decision-making power from the client. See Gerald Dworkin, 
Autonomy and Informed Consent, in 3 HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 105, at 
63, 79 ("[T]he difficulty [in deciding whether to accept a waiver] is a practical 
one-determining that the waiver is not simply psychological denial or a process of 
infantilization or of giving in to the pressures of the doctor."). 
110. To make out a violation of equal protection, current case law also requires 
a showing of discriminatory motive. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 
(1976). 
111. See BEAUCHAMP & CmLDRESS, supra note 31, at 57. 
334 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1997 
Virtuous character depends not only upon morally correct ac-
tions, but requires correct motives as well.112 
Still there might he nothing wrong in the intentions Simon 
expressed.113 This depends to some extent upon why one values 
autonomy. An important component of autonomy and its ex-
pressive value is that it treats the other person as an autono-
mous agent.114 Howard Lesnick, commenting upon a presenta-
tion I made a number of years ago, expressed this idea another 
way. He stated: 
I honestly do not think it matters which position the attorney 
takes-to leave the final decision with the client or insist on 
keeping it-so much as I think it matters whether the attorney 
makes either decision in a way that respects the concerns of 
both attorney and client, and treats the client as an under-
standing independent person .... 115 
When confronted with a request for an opinion, the dilemma for 
the autonomy practitioner is deciding whether acceding to that 
request or ignoring it, in the hope the client will make the deci-
sion, shows more respect for the client's capacities as an inde-
pendent agent. The lawyer's motive is not to prevent the client 
from making a wrong decision. Her fear is that the client will 
fail to make any decision at all.116 The autonomy practitioner 
112. See id. at 62-64. 
113. Simon is ambiguous as to what his motive was. His exact words are: "My 
decision to withhold my views could be supported as well by saying that it was not 
in Mrs. Jones's best interests for her to delegate the decision to someone as ignorant 
about both the law and her as I was then." Simon, supra note 1, at 217. But if his 
motives are the same as the autonomy practitioner then he is correct that there are 
no differences, but it is because he is a practitioner of the refined autonomy view. 
Therefore, I think it is fair to attribute the intentions or motives that I do in the text 
to see if it makes a difference. 
114. See Dworkin, supra note 109, at 74 ("We desire to be recognized by others 
as the kind of creature capable of determining our own destiny."); cf. BEAUCHAMP & 
CHILDRESS, supra note 31, at 125 ("Being autonomous is not the same as being 
respected as an autonomous agent. To respect an autonomous agent is, at a 
minimum, to acknowledge that person's rights to hold views, to make choices, and to 
take actions based upon personal values and beliefs. Such respect involves respectful 
action, not merely a respectful attitude."). 
115. EIJZABETH DVORKIN ET AL., BECOMING A LAWYER: A HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE 
ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONALISM 202 (1981) (comment of Howard Lesnick). 
Another way to express what is lacking is the virtue of "deliberative judgment." See 
Amy Gutmann, Can Virtue be Taught to Lawyers?, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1759 (1993). 
116. It can be argued that the failure to decide is a decision. In some cases this 
is true. See generally Shapiro, supra note 72. But the difficult question is whether the 
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may get it wrong, but if she takes her task seriously, it is out of 
respect for the client. Simon's reasons for denying the client this 
information do not show respect for Mrs. Jones's capacities. 
Rather they reveal fear that she will make the wrong decision, 
i.e., she will rely upon an ignorant lawyer.ll7 
The impact or harm, however, is not only to the client. Harm 
is also done to the lawyer. This suggests another reason inten-
tions matter. Intentions as well as actions shape character. And 
although virtue theory raises difficult questions about what the 
appropriate virtues are in modern society, Amy Gutmann argues 
convincingly that a necessary virtue for lawyers is what she calls 
the deliberative virtues-"the disposition and capacity oflawyers 
to deliberate with nonlawyers . . . about the practical implica-
tions of legal action and its alternatives."118 Much of Simon's 
essay can be read as arguing that refined paternalism is consis-
tent with the exercise of deliberative virtue. Yet his own exam-
ples do not support this reading. As stated above, Simon sug-
gests that refusing to give Mrs. Jones his opinion can be justified 
by the likelihood that she would make the wrong decision by 
relying upon him. In his discussion of the possibility that talk of 
jail might disable Mrs. Jones, Simon states he would be justified 
in telling her there was no possibility that she could go to jail.119 
Neither of these options is an exercise of deliberative virtue; 
rather, they constitute exercises of power to achieve a particular 
end. 
Simon, at the least, needs further argument to establish that 
there is no difference in moral quality between the refined 
paternalist and the practitioner of the refined autonomy view. 
Only if one thinks that reasons for acting are irrelevant, or that 
there is no significant difference between a refined paternalist's 
reasons for acting in a particular way and the reasons of the 
autonomy practitioner, can it be claimed that the refined 
paternalist and the refined practitioner of autonomy view are 
the same by showing their behavior is similar. Otherwise, there 
client has "decided" not to decide. See Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking, 
supra note 3, at 83. 
117. But see Dworkin, supra note 109, at 81 {"To fail to seek consent, as in the 
case of therapeutic privilege, is necessarily an insult to autonomy even though 
motivated by pure benevolence."}. 
118. Gutmann, supra note 115, at 1759. 
119. See Simon, supra note 1, at 219. 
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has to be debate as to whether the differences in motives or 
intentions matter. Moreover, virtues viewed as preconceptions 
or dispositions inevitably affect behavior. To that extent, even if 
we have an example of similar behavior in a particular in-
stance, there will inevitably be significant differences over time 
between the practitioner of the refined autonomy view and the 
refined paternalist. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Professor Simon states that for the thoughtful autonomy 
proponent "the client's autonomy is as much a goal as a premise 
of the counseling relation.,,12o I agree. We disagree on the signif-
icance of having that goal. There are still significant differences 
in practice between tha refined autonomy view and the refined 
paternalist view because the goals and intent of the lawyer 
affect both the meaning and the texture of relationships be-
tween lawyer and client. Lawyers who believe in refined pater-
nalism will act differently at critical moments from lawyers 
who believe the decision belongs to the client. Mrs. Jones's story 
illustrates those differences. Finally, even if Mrs. Jones's story 
shows that there is similarity in behavior between the two 
viewpoints, the intentions of the lawyers matter. Even if we 
accept that the behavior of the refined paternalist and the prac-
titioner of sophisticated views of autonomy are very similar, the 
lawyer's intentions in each case have moral significance. 
Nevertheless, Simon has made a valuable contribution by 
reminding us that both in theory and in practice the refined 
autonomy view and refined paternalism may not be as far apart 
as is sometimes claimed. Moreover, by focusing on the inevita-
bility of lawyers influencing clients, he forces us to consider not 
only whether lawyers should influence clients, but under what 
conditions and in what situations we should recognize such 
influence and to what extent we should be concerned about it. 
Finally, Simon's willingness to break down these categories 
suggests further focus on ways in which influence and power 
travel in both directions, even with lawyer interactions with 
individuals. Lawyers not only have influence and power over 
their clients, but clients have influence and power over their 
120. [d. 
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lawyers.121 All this makes attention to context vital. It also may 
make it unrealistic to adopt general models or theories for ap-
plication to all lawyer-client interactions. I believe it is impor-
tant, however, to face those issues directly rather than by sug-
gesting that there is no meaningful difference between auton-
omy and paternalism. 
At the end of his essay, Simon switches the focus to our-
selves. "Ourselves" includes both academics who write about 
these issues and lawyers who are concerned about justifYing 
their behavior. Simon speculates as to why the debate between 
the autonomy view and the paternalist view inspires so much 
energy even though in his view it is "so often moot."122 His an-
swer is that "[t]he crude autonomy view is attractive to lawyers 
because it absolves them of the burdens of connection and the 
responsibilities of power.,,123 Paternalist views are frightening 
because they emphasize "the inescapability oflawyer power.,,124 
Finally, according to Simon, the refined autonomy view through 
its rhetorical association with the crude autonomy view "evokes 
some of the psychologically comforting associations of the latter 
and makes it more palatable than refined paternalism, even 
when they are functionally indistinguishable.,,125 
One obvious response to the above is that the refined 
paternalist position and the refined autonomy view are not the 
same. That response is the subject of this article. But I also 
want to offer some of my own speculation. The attractiveness of 
the autonomy view can stem from its denial of responsibility 
and that is a substantial problem. We need a way for lawyers to 
accept responsibility for their actions without controlling the 
lives of others. Furthermore, as Simon stated in a more recent 
article, some of the newer literature about poverty lawyers and 
their clients seems to romanticize poor clients and to assume 
that the only problem is lawyer domination.126 Simon is correct 
121. See William L. F. Feltsiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of Power; 
Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer·Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1447 (1992); Austin Sarat & William L. F. Felstiner, Law and Strategy in the 
Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 L. & Soc'Y REV. 93, 96, 125 (1986). 
122. Simon, supra note 1, at 225. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 225-26. 
125. Id. at 226. 
126. See Simon, Dark Secret, supra note 28, at 1111-14. 
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about these problems of the autonomy view. He ignores, how-
ever, the parallel problems or difficulties of the paternalistic 
view. Just as the autonomy view can be psychologically comfort-
ing because it allows lawyers to refuse responsibility for their 
actions, the refined paternalist view can be comforting because 
it allows lawyers to exercise paternalism while claiming only to 
be implementing what the client truly desires. Furthermore, 
although the crude autonomy view may be the easiest stance, 
the hardest position is to accept responsibility for one's power 
in a relationship without dominating or asserting power over 
the other. Ultimately, however, both Professor Simon and I 
believe that whether one is a proponent of the autonomy view 
or a paternalist, good lawyering involves more than following 
mechanical models. It requires serious dialogue with one's cli-
ent. I offer this Article in the spirit of engaging in such dia-
logue. 
